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THE ROLE OF INTENT IN THE RISE OF
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN AML-BSA
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Tyler Halloran*
ABSTRACT
The statutory framework which prohibits individuals at financial
institutions from engaging in money laundering attributes criminal or
civil liability on the basis of an individual’s culpability with respect to
the prohibited conduct. A recent Department of Justice policy shift has
begun to place a greater focus on the prosecution of individuals within
corporations. This shift has led to increased prosecutions of
compliance personnel and bank officials in recent years.
Through analysis of recent cases, this Note seeks to explore how the
requirement of intentional and/or willful conduct defines the potential
for criminal and/or civil exposure for compliance personnel and bank
officials under the AML-BSA statutory framework. This shift in
enforcement has been criticized as unfair and overly harsh; however,
through analysis of recent AML-BSA enforcement actions, this Note
demonstrates that the statutory and prosecutorial focus on culpable
conduct undermines that criticism. Further, this Note demonstrates
that the recent shift towards individual accountability in AML-BSA
enforcement can help serve to deter violations of the BSA, and money
laundering activity generally, moving forward.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, criminal prosecutions and civil actions against financial
institutions for violating the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act1
(“AML-BSA enforcement actions”)2 did not seek to hold individuals
accountable for specific violations.3 As a result of this practice, the
government faced significant public criticism for a perceived failure to
pursue seemingly intentional misconduct.4 Ultimately, regulators began
to acknowledge that individual accountability for wrongdoing within

1. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the obligations of financial institutions under the
Bank Secrecy Act, such as, the requirements for a risk-based compliance program and
reporting obligations for suspicious activity).
2. “AML” stands for “anti-money laundering.” For the purposes of this Note, the
term “AML-BSA enforcement action” is intended to encompass civil liability under the
BSA, criminal liability under the BSA, and liability for money laundering as an
independent crime for individuals at financial institutions.
3. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV.
1789, 1816 (2015) (finding that “[n]o individual officers or employees were prosecuted
in cases accompanying the fourteen deferred and non-prosecution agreements involving
banks violating the Bank Secrecy Act” between 2001 and 2014).
4. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Boles, Financial Sector Executives as Targets for Money
Laundering Liability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 405 (2015) (discussing public expectations
that individuals should be held directly accountable for money laundering violations).
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corporations is essential to ensure effective deterrence5 and to maintain
the public’s faith in the justice system.6 A recent policy shift within the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has begun to place a greater focus on the
prosecution of individuals within corporations.7 This has led to increased
prosecutions of compliance personnel and bank officials for violations of
the Bank Secrecy Act (the “BSA”) and other money laundering statutes.8
This shift in enforcement has been criticized as unfair and overly harsh.9
However, this Note demonstrates that the statutory and prosecutorial
focus on an individual’s culpability in relation to the conduct substantially
mitigates any such concerns.10 Further, this Note demonstrates that the
recent shift towards individual accountability in AML-BSA enforcement
can help deter violations of the BSA and restore public confidence in the
justice system.11
Part I of this Note reviews relevant concepts in criminal law,
explores the harm of money laundering, and explains the importance of
intentional conduct in the AML-BSA statutory framework. Part II
outlines the recent rise of individual accountability in AML-BSA
enforcement actions and describes criticism which has been offered
against it. Part III explains how (1) AML-BSA enforcement actions
against individuals require a high degree of culpability by compliance
personnel or bank officials; (2) criticisms offered against increased
individual accountability are largely misguided because of the focus on
culpability; and (3) the recent shift towards individual accountability in
AML-BSA enforcement can serve to deter violations of the BSA and
restore the public’s faith in the justice system.

5. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, NYU Program on Corporate Compliance and
Enforcement (Nov. 18, 2016) https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-speechnew-york-university-111816.html) [https://perma.cc/M3HN-XN9D] (stating that
“[h]olding individuals liable for wrongdoing is a core pillar of any strong enforcement
program. A company, after all, can only act through its employees, and to have a strong
deterrent effect on market participants . . .”).
6. Cf. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
to all U.S. Att’ys et al., at 1 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/
archives/dag/individual-accountability [https://perma.cc/P9BZ-8AHG] (noting that
individual accountability “promotes the public’s confidence in our justice system.”).
7. Id.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.C.3.
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part III.C.

2019]

INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY
IN AML-BSA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

239

I. THE ROLE OF CULPABILITY IN THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
PROHIBITING MONEY LAUNDERING IN THE UNITED STATES
The statutory framework prohibiting money laundering in the United
States establishes criminal or civil liability only for culpable individuals
who have engaged in some form of intentional or reckless misconduct.12
This section provides a detailed discussion of the role of culpability in
various federal statutes that prohibit money laundering in the United
States.
A. CRIMINAL LAW CONCEPTS: CULPABILITY, DETERRENCE, AND
RETRIBUTION
This Note argues the law should be applied to punish culpable
individuals with balanced consideration of retributive and utilitarian
motivations for punishment.13
Retributive justice calls for punishment because the conduct itself
deviates from what society deems morally acceptable and serves as a form
of retaliation by society against the criminal.14 Utilitarian justice calls for
punishment as a form of deterrence to prevent the individual criminal, and
society in general, from engaging in the prohibited conduct in the future.15
In the context of individual accountability for money laundering by
financial institutions, public demands for individual accountability reflect
retributive motivations for punishment of wrongdoing,16 whereas
regulators’ focus on individual accountability generally reflects utilitarian
motivations seeking deterrence.17 Prosecuting individuals in a manner
that reflects both retributive and utilitarian objectives is essential to
12.
13.

See infra Part I.B.
See Alan M. Gershel, In Sentencing, Utilitarianism vs. Retributivism, N.Y.
TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Feb. 18, 2014, 8:33PM) https://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2014/02/18/affluenza-and-life-circumstances-in-sentencing/insentencing-utilitarianism-vs-retributivism [https://perma.cc/S8DC-3HL9].
14. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 17 (7th ed. 2015).
15. Id. at 15.
16. See Daniel Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265,
276 (2014).
17. White, supra note 5 (former SEC Chair White stated, “[h]olding individuals
liable for wrongdoing is a core pillar of any strong enforcement program. A company,
after all, can only act through its employees, and to have a strong deterrent effect on
market participants, it is absolutely critical that responsible individuals be charged and
that we pursue the evidence as high as it can take us.”).
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maintaining the public’s confidence in the justice system and to
preventing future crime.18
Mens rea is a concept in criminal law that assigns the requisite
mental state required for liability for a given offense.19 For example,
intentionally killing someone creates liability for murder which results in
harsh punishment.20 On the other hand, unintentionally killing someone
results in less harsh criminal punishment.21 In certain circumstances,
someone could die as the result of negligence, which would only result in
civil liability.22 From the standpoint of retributive justice, the concept of
mens rea ensures that punishment is congruent to the extent that an
individual is culpable and furthers the societal expectation that liberty
should not be denied to one who has acted without culpability for the
offense.23 Mens rea also furthers deterrence interests, as it aims to steer
individuals away from intentionally engaging in crime.24 Federal District
Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff has written that in the context of holding
corporate executives liable for fraud, “the fierce and fiery weapon called
criminal prosecution is directed at intentional misconduct, and nothing
less.”25
The mens rea of “willful,” while often considered synonymous with
“intentional,” is best understood in the context in which it is applied.26
The BSA requires “willful” conduct for both civil and criminal liability,
but courts have construed different mens rea requirements depending on
the civil or criminal nature of the case.27
18. Cf. Yates, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that individual accountability for corporate
crime “deters future illegal activity, it incentivizes changes in corporate behavior, it
ensures that the proper parties are held responsible for their actions, and it promotes the
public’s confidence in our justice system.”).
19. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 119.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., id. at 132-33.
23. See DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 121 (stating that mens rea is “founded on the
belief that it is morally unjust to punish those who innocently, rather than culpably, cause
social injury.”).
24. Id. at 120.
25. See Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level
Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executiveprosecutions [https://perma.cc/PQ54-GCN3].
26. See DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 130.
27. See infra Part I.B.3.

2019]

INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY
IN AML-BSA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

241

B. THE PROHIBITION OF MONEY LAUNDERING UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Money laundering is the process by which money derived from
illegal activity is filtered through some other source to appear legitimate.28
By enabling criminal conduct, money laundering is directly or indirectly
linked to the proliferation of narcotics, illegal weapons, terrorism, public
corruption, reduced tax revenues, the destabilization of financial
institutions, and increased costs to the government in law enforcement
and healthcare.29 Financial institutions are indispensable to the core
process of money laundering in which illicit funds enter the legitimate
economy.30 Therefore, the devastating social and economic impact of
money laundering can be exacerbated if individuals at banks are not
motivated to prevent it through consistent enforcement of the statutory
prohibitions currently in place.31
The federal government has passed a series of laws which, together,
have formed a statutory framework that seeks to deter money laundering
by financial institutions (the “AML-BSA statutory framework”).32 The
AML-BSA statutory framework seeks to accomplish this by: (1)
establishing that money laundering is punishable as an independent
crime;33 (2) requiring that certain procedures be in place at financial
institutions to prevent money laundering;34 and (3) establishing civil
and/or criminal liability for individuals and financial institutions that fail
to implement the requisite anti-money-laundering procedures.35 An
important feature of the provisions that allow for individual liability is the
requirement of some form of “willful” or “intentional” conduct; as

28.
29.
30.

Boles, supra note 4, at 368–69.
Boles, supra note 4, at 374–75.
See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING RISK
ASSESSMENT 2 n.1 (2015) (discussing the phases of money laundering: placement,
layering, and infiltration).
31. See, e.g., Boles, supra note 4, at 374–76 (discussing the relevant statutes which
address the harms of money laundering).
32. Id. at 374–81 (discussing the original enactment of the BSA in 1970 and
subsequent legislation such as the Money Laundering Control Act (1986), the AnnunzioWylie Anti-Money Laundering Act (1992), and the PATRIOT Act (2001) each of which
created new AML obligations for financial institutions).
33. See infra Part I.B.1; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (2012).
34. See infra Part I.B.2.
35. See infra Part I.B.3.
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discussed below, “willful” means something different in the civil versus
the criminal context.36
1. Money Laundering as an Independent Crime for Individuals
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 established money
laundering as an independent crime.37 An individual who knowingly takes
part in a transaction to (a) “conceal or disguise” the nature of proceeds of
unlawful activity, or (b) “avoid a transaction reporting requirement under
State or Federal law,” can face a fine of up to $500,000 and up to 20 years
in prison.38 In order to be criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 for
money laundering, an individual must have (1) specific knowledge that
the funds were derived from unlawful activity,39 and (2) taken part in
concealing the nature of the proceeds or avoiding a transaction reporting
requirement.40 This places a heavy burden on the government to prove
that an individual intended to engage in money laundering. Liability under
section 1956 can be applied to individuals at financial institutions when
their conduct reflects the statutory requirement of intentional conduct.41
2. The Obligations of Financial Institutions Under the BSA
The BSA serves as the primary statute defining financial institutions’
obligations to maintain policies and procedures that combat money
laundering and report suspicious activity to federal authorities.42 The BSA
has been amended several times since its enactment in 1970.43 Today, the

36.
37.
38.
39.

See infra Part I.B.1; see also infra Part I.B.3.
Boles, supra note 4, at 377.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Justice Manual: Criminal Resource Manual § 2101, (last
visited Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2101money-laundering-overview [https://perma.cc/JY9K-FC2W] [hereinafter Justice
Manual].
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B).
41. Information at 21–22, United States v. Tim Leissner, Cr. No. 18-439 (MKB)
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) [hereinafter Leissner Information].
42. Sharon C. Levin et al., Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement: The Rise of
Individual Liability for Compliance Professionals, 49 REV. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG.
255, 256 (2016).
43. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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BSA’s “five pillars” require financial institutions to maintain a “riskbased” AML program,44 which includes:
(1) a system of internal controls to assure ongoing compliance; (2)
independent testing for compliance to be conducted by bank personnel
or by an outside party; (3) designation of an individual or individuals
responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance;
(4) training for appropriate personnel; and (5) appropriate risk-based
procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence.45

The term “risk-based” is intended to convey that there is no “onesize-fits-all” solution and each financial institution must maintain a
compliance program that adequately addresses the unique money
laundering risks faced by the firm.46 The fifth pillar is an important “know
your customer” obligation, which requires banks to maintain records of
clients’ identities and compare them to lists of known terrorists.47
In addition to the maintenance of an adequate compliance program,
financial institutions are required to report certain transaction activity to
the government.48 This obligation has two main features, financial
institutions must report: (1) cash transactions over $10,000 through
Currency Transaction Reports (“CTRs”),49 and (2) activity they suspect
may violate the BSA through Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) to
alert the government of “odd or questionable financial activity.”50 The
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) is a bureau of the
Treasury Department which promulgates rules relating to compliance
with the BSA, receives and stores SARs, and has authority to bring civil
enforcement actions against financial institutions for violations of the
BSA.51 In addition to FinCEN, the DOJ, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) frequently bring AML-BSA enforcement actions.52

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Levin et al., supra note 42, at 256.
31 C.F.R. § 1020.210 (2016).
Levin et al., supra note 42, at 256.
Boles, supra note 4, at 381.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id. at 379–80.
Levin et al., supra note 42, at 256, n.4.
Id. at 257.
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Financial institutions may have both criminal and civil liability in the
event that they fail to meet their obligations under the BSA.53 Penalties
vary based on the type of entity, the specific conduct, and the level of
intent to engage in the prohibited conduct.54 Typically, this criminal
and/or civil liability translates into a deferred prosecution agreement
(“DPA”), wherein in exchange for suspension of prosecution, the
financial institution agrees to a number of items which may include the
payment of a fine, changes to its compliance program, the appointment of
a monitor, or other conditions.55 More recently, DPAs for BSA violations
have frequently required financial institutions to acknowledge the
conduct charged in an action filed against them56 and typically require the
payment of fines which are larger than in previous years.57
3. Criminal and Civil Liability for Individuals under the BSA
Individuals can also be civilly and criminally liable for “willful”
violations of the BSA.58 As discussed above, the concept of “willful”
conduct requires context to understand the requisite mens rea.59 Generally
speaking, the line between intentional conduct and reckless conduct is
what separates the potential for criminal and civil liability for individuals’
violations of BSA requirements.60
53.
54.

Id. at 256–57.
JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45076, TRENDS IN BANK SECRECY
ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ENFORCEMENT 1 (2018).
55. Paola C. Henry, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crimes after the Yates:
Memo Deferred Prosecution Agreements & Criminal Justice Reform, 6 AM. BUS. L. REV.
154, 155–57, 163 (2016).
56. SYKES, supra note 54, at 3 (discussing FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky
Calvery’s statement that “acceptance of responsibility and acknowledgement of the facts
is a critical component of corporate responsibility”).
57. Id. at 2.
58. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (2012) (stating that “a partner, director, officer, or
employee of a domestic financial institution or nonfinancial trade or business, willfully
violating this subchapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this
subchapter.”); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012) (stating that “[a] person willfully
violating this subchapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this subchapter
. . . shall be fined not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both.”).
59. See DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 130.
60. See Norman v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 189, 192 (2018) (citing to Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)) (as of the time of this writing, Norman v.
United States pending appeal before the Federal Circuit); see also United States v.
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a. Civil Liability for Individuals under the BSA
In the civil context, under 31 U.S.C. § 5321, the government can hold
individuals accountable for “willfully” violating the provisions of the
BSA.61 Courts have construed the statutory requirement of willful conduct
to be consistent with its use in the civil context generally, which “cover[s]
not only knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well.”62 31
U.S.C. § 5321 has also been interpreted to include behavior amounting to
“willful blindness,”63 which is where individuals purposefully avoid
knowledge that could lead to liability for a given offense.64 A compliance
officer cannot avoid knowledge that the compliance program is deficient
or that specific criminal activity is occurring in order to subvert his or her
legal duty act on the basis of that knowledge under the BSA.65 Such
conduct would be considered reckless or willfully blind, and would be
subject to civil sanctions under 31 U.S.C. § 5321.66
b. Criminal Liability for Individuals under the BSA
Individuals can be held criminally liable for violating the
requirements of the BSA under 31 U.S.C. § 532467 and 31 U.S.C. §

Robins, 673 F. App’x 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that “to convict Robins under §
5322(a) here, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) in the
course of his business (2) he knowingly received “more than $10,000 in cash or currency
in 1 transaction (or 2 or more related transactions)” and (3) he failed to report such
transaction to FinCEN (4) with knowledge that it was unlawful to do so.”) (citing 31
U.S.C. § 5322(a)); see also United States v. Caro, 454 F. App’x 817, 839 n.24 (11th Cir.
2012) (citing United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1262 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating
that “the only mental state that the Government must prove in prosecutions for structuring
is the purpose of having a financial institution not file a required report.”)).
61. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1).
62. Norman, 138 Fed. Cl. at 192 (citing to Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S.
47, 57 (2007)).
63. See, e.g., Levin et al., supra note 42, at 259 (discussing FinCEN’s civil
enforcement action against MoneyGram’s Chief Compliance Officer, Timothy Haider,
for failing to report criminal activity of which he was aware).
64. See DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 130.
65. Levin et al., supra note 42, at 256–57.
66. Id.
67. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(d) (2012) (stating that “[w]hoever violates this section
while violating another law of the United States or as part of a pattern of any illegal
activity involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period shall be fined twice the
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5322.68 Both provisions require the government to prove that the
individual acted with some form of intent to evade the requirements of
the BSA, but 31 U.S.C. § 5322 also requires that the government prove
the individual knew his or her actions were unlawful.69
31 U.S.C. § 5324 specifically prohibits “structuring,”70 which is
when an individual takes a large amount of money and breaks it into
smaller amounts in order to prevent a financial institution from filing a
cash transaction report.71 In order for an individual to be charged under
31 U.S.C. § 5324, “(1) the defendant must, in fact, have engaged in acts
of structuring; (2) he must have done so with knowledge that the financial
institutions involved were legally obligated to report currency
transactions in excess of $10,000; and (3) he must have acted with the
intent to evade this reporting requirement.”72 Therefore, criminal liability
under 31 U.S.C. § 5324 requires prosecutors to demonstrate the
individual’s intent to evade the reporting requirements.73 This does not
require proving that the individual had knowledge of the illegality of his
or her own actions.74
Criminal liability is provided under 31 U.S.C. § 5322 for those who
act “willfully” to violate other provisions of the BSA and does not apply
to the requirements for “structuring” under 31 U.S.C. § 5324.75 The
government must prove that an individual had knowledge that his or her

amount provided in subsection (b)(3) or (c)(3) (as the case may be) of section 3571 of
title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.”).
68. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322.
69. See infra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
70. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2012).
71. Julia Kagan, Structured Transaction, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/structured-transaction.asp
[https://perma.cc/Y5BX-ZYMZ].
72. See United States v. Taylor, 816 F.3d 12, 22 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing United States
v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2005)).
73. See United States v. Caro, 454 F. App’x 817, 839 n.24 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1262 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that “the only
mental state that the Government must prove in prosecutions for structuring is the
purpose of having a financial institution not file a required report.”)).
74. See id.
75. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (this statute explicitly carves out applicability to conduct
governed by 31 U.S.C. § 5324).
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conduct was unlawful in order for criminal liability to exist under 31
U.S.C. § 5322 for a non-structuring violation of the BSA.76
Taken together, 31 U.S.C. § 5324 and 31 U.S.C. § 5322 demonstrate
that some form of intentional conduct is necessary for an individual to be
found guilty of a criminal violation of the BSA.77 This is distinguishable
from “reckless” or “willfully blind” conduct which could be the subject
of civil sanctions under 31 U.S.C. § 5321.78
II. THE EMERGENCE OF INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN FEDERAL
AML-BSA ENFORCEMENT
Historically, the BSA has been enforced solely through DPAs with
financial institutions, and individuals within the firms have not been held
accountable.79 Recently, however, the government has increasingly
sought to hold individuals at financial institutions accountable for
violations of the BSA in certain circumstances.80 This recent shift has
followed a larger change in DOJ policy that occurred in September 2015
which called for an increased focus on individual accountability
whenever the government is seeking to prosecute a corporation (the
“Yates Memo”).81 Part II details (A) the historical enforcement of the
BSA, (B) the policies set forth in Yates Memo, and (C) the AML-BSA
enforcement actions that have been pursued by the Obama and Trump
administrations in the years following the Yates Memo.
A. HISTORICAL AML-BSA ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN 2001–2014
In the past, financial institutions that were prosecuted for violations
of the BSA typically entered into DPAs.82 Prosecutors have authority to

76. See United States v. Robins, 673 F. App’x 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that “to
convict Robins under § 5322(a) here, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that (1) in the course of his business (2) he knowingly received ‘more than $10,000
in cash or currency in 1 transaction (or 2 or more related transactions)’ and (3) he failed
to report such transaction to FinCEN (4) with knowledge that it was unlawful to do so.”)
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a)).
77. See supra notes 72, 75.
78. See Levin et al., supra note 42, at 256.
79. See Henry, supra note 55, at 156.
80. See Levin et al., supra note 42, at 258.
81. See Yates, supra note 6, at 4.
82. See Henry, supra note 55, at 155.
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enter into DPAs under the Speedy Trial Act.83 DPAs were originally
meant to rehabilitate lower-level or non-violent offenders; however, they
have now come to be commonly used in cases involving not only money
laundering, but also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations,
product safety violations, environmental crimes, fraud, and other
corporate crimes.84 From 2001 to 2014, the government entered into a
total of fourteen DPAs with financial institutions for violations of the
BSA, none of which included individual liability for compliance
personnel or bank officers.85 Critics argue that the use of DPAs leads to a
lack of individual accountability, which inhibits the deterrence of future
misconduct by corporations.86 To be clear, individuals at financial
institutions have been charged criminally and civilly under the BSA on
multiple occasions prior to 201487—but not in conjunction with an
investigation of the financial institution itself for violations of the BSA.88
This Note is focused solely on individual accountability alongside AMLBSA enforcement actions against financial institutions that employ
culpable individuals.
HSBC’s 2012 DPA is instructive of how AML-BSA enforcement
actions against financial institutions worked during this period of time.89
HSBC’s failure to maintain an adequate compliance program resulted in
the laundering of $881 million, derived from narcotics trafficking by
Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel and Colombia’s Norte del Valle cartel.90 HSBC
Mexico was repeatedly warned by Mexican law enforcement regarding
their concern that the cash was being deposited into HSBC by drug
cartels.91 In fact, the CEO of HSBC Mexico was informed that a drug lord
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 156.
Id. at 158.
See Garrett, supra note 3, at 1816.
See Henry, supra note 55, at 155.
See, e.g., United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 494 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding
the conviction of William Donovan, president and chief executive officer of Atlantic
Trust Company, for criminal violations of the BSA under 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a)).
88. See Garrett, supra note 3, at 1816.
89. Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to pay $1.9 billion U.S. fine in moneylaundering case, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-hsbc-probe/hsbc-to-pay-1-9-billion-u-s-fine-in-money-laundering-caseidUSBRE8BA05M20121211 [https://perma.cc/QJH8-F6C6].
90. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL
3306161, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013); these facts are as alleged in the DPA, in which
HSBC admitted to criminal wrongdoing. See id. at *11.
91. Viswanatha, supra note 89.
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was recorded stating that “HSBC Mexico was the place to launder
money.”92 Under the terms of the DPA, HSBC admitted criminal
wrongdoing93 and paid fines amounting to $1.92 billion.94 HSBC also
increased its spending on compliance by nine times from 2009 to 2011,
committed to a global review of its “know your customer” files at an
estimated cost of $700 million, and clawed back bonuses of several senior
executives.95 However, despite the egregious nature of the conduct, no
individual at HSBC was held criminally or civilly liable for any of the
conduct described above.96
The reasons for this historical lack of accountability are not exactly
clear. Daniel Richman, a former federal prosecutor, suggests that the
reasons for this lack of individual accountability are complicated and
include, amongst other things, a lack of prosecutorial resources, heavy
reliance by the government on internal investigations conducted by the
institutions being prosecuted, unfamiliarity with financial markets,97 and
the difficulty of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt.98 Former U.S.
Attorney General Eric Holder noted that “in some instances, it is simply
not possible to establish knowledge of a particular scheme on the part of
a high-ranking executive who is far removed from a firm’s day-to-day
operations.”99 In any event, the lack of individual accountability for
financial institutions’ violations of the BSA came under sharp criticism.100
This criticism was somewhat amplified by the widely held perception that

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161, at *11.
Viswanatha, supra note 89.
Id.
Garrett, supra note 3, at 1818 (quoting Senator Charles Grassley saying, “The
Department has not prosecuted a single employee of HSBC—no executives, no directors,
no AML compliance staff members, no one. By allowing these individuals to walk away
without any real punishment, the Department is declaring that crime actually does pay.
Functionally, HSBC has quite literally purchased a get-out-of-jail-free card for its
employees for the price of $1.92 billion dollars.”).
97. Richman, supra note 16, at 273.
98. Id. at 269.
99. Eric Holder, Attorney General, DOJ, Attorney General Holder Remarks on
Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of Law (Sept. 17, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-remarks-financial-fraudprosecutions-nyu-school-law.
100. Boles, supra note 4, at 404.

250

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXV

executives on Wall Street were not held accountable for the circumstances
that led to the 2008 financial crisis.101
B. THE YATES MEMORANDUM AND ITS REQUIREMENTS
In 2015, then-Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates issued a
memorandum which called for increased accountability for individuals
when the DOJ prosecutes corporations.102 The Yates Memo was in many
ways a pivotal recognition of the value of individual accountability as a
means of deterrence and as essential to the public’s perception of the
justice system. The memo stated that individual accountability “deters
future illegal activity; it incentivizes changes in corporate behavior; it
ensures that the proper parties are held responsible for their actions; and
it promotes the public’s confidence in our justice system.” 103 The contents
of the Yates Memo have since been included in the U.S. Attorney’s
Manual section entitled “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations.”104
The Yates Memo requires corporations to provide all relevant facts
regarding individuals responsible for misconduct in order to receive any
cooperation credit105 from the government.106 The memo emphasizes that
government attorneys should not simply receive the information and take
it for what it is, but instead, attorneys should proactively investigate
individuals at every step of the process.107 Another key focus of the policy
is that both criminal and civil attorneys should make individual
responsibility a priority from the inception of the investigation and should

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Richman, supra note 16, at 266.
See Yates, supra note 6, at 1.
Id.
Henry, supra note 55, at 159.
Cooperation credit is a term used to describe programs which reward the subjects
of an investigation with reduced fines and more lenient punishment in exchange for
cooperation with an investigation. See Jonathan C. Schwartz & David G. Buffa,
Cooperation Credit in Enforcement Proceedings: The Importance of Independence,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: COMMERCIAL & BUSINESS LITIGATION (Aug. 8, 2018),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/commercial/articles/summer20160816-cooperation-credit-enforcement-proceedings-importance-of-independence.html
[https://perma.cc/TH4N-KA3Y].
106. See Yates, supra note 6, at 3.
107. Id. at 4.
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not resolve cases until they have actively considered the individual
misconduct.108
By leveraging all cooperation credit on information about personal
wrongdoing, the policies in the Yates Memo seek to mitigate any harmful
effects of the DOJ’s reliance on internal investigations carried out by
corporations.109 Further, by urging both criminal and civil DOJ attorneys
to prioritize individual accountability from the beginning,110 the Yates
Memo makes clear that both criminal and civil liability should be actively
considered.
C. BSA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOLLOWING THE YATES MEMORANDUM
Following the issuance of the Yates Memo, the government has
increasingly held individuals at financial institutions accountable for
AML-BSA violations through: (1) civil sanctions under the BSA, (2)
criminal charges under the BSA, and (3) criminal charges under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956.
1. Emerging Individual Accountability Following the Yates Memo
FinCEN brought a civil enforcement action for violation of the BSA
in 2014 against former MoneyGram Chief Compliance Officer (CCO)
Thomas Haider in connection with a larger investigation into
MoneyGram.111 Two of FinCEN’s allegations addressed the “willful”
nature of Haider’s conduct: (1) Haider was alleged to have had direct
knowledge of frauds being perpetrated using MoneyGram’s service and
failed to take corrective action against anyone involved, and (2) Haider
had knowledge of or had reason to suspect fraud, money laundering, and
other criminal activity, and failed to submit SARs to FinCEN.112 Haider
initially challenged FinCEN’s authority to bring an action against him as
an individual under the BSA, but a federal court in Minnesota held that
“the BSA expressly authorizes FinCEN to assess a civil penalty and then

108.
109.

Id. at 2.
See Richman, supra note 16, at 273 (discussing the tendency of prosecutors to
rely on internal investigations).
110. See Yates, supra note 6, at 2.
111. Levin et al., supra note 42, at 259 n.17 (the case began in 2014 and was resolved
after the issuance of the Yates Memo in 2016).
112. Id.
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commence a civil action to recover that penalty.”113 Following this
decision, Haider settled with FinCEN for a $250,000 fine and a three-year
ban from working in financial compliance.114 As part of this settlement,
Haider acknowledged that he failed to take corrective action despite being
presented with information that “strongly indicated” ongoing consumer
fraud schemes.115
In 2014, FINRA brought a civil enforcement action against Harold
Crawford, former CCO of Brown Brothers Harriman (“BBH”). FINRA
alleged that Crawford was aware of anonymous securities transactions
being conducted by foreign individuals through BBH accounts that were
said to be related to insider trading.116 Although Crawford eventually
recommended that this activity be put to an end, his recommendations
were never implemented.117 Accordingly, Crawford did not cause any
change in policy at BBH despite his knowledge of ongoing misconduct.
Crawford paid a $25,000 fine and received a one-month ban—Crawford
did not admit or deny any of the alleged wrongdoing in connection with
this matter.118
In 2016, FINRA fined a compliance officer, Linda Busby from
Raymond James & Associates, $25,000 and suspended her for three
months for allegedly failing to “establish and implement adequate AML
procedures”—Busby neither admitted or denied FINRA’s charges.119
Unlike Haider and Crawford, Busby did not have specific knowledge of
wrongdoing.120 However, Busby’s failure to establish an adequate AML
113.
114.

United States v. Haider, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2292, at *12 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016).
Press Release, FinCEN, FinCEN and Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announce
Settlement with Former MoneyGram Executive Thomas E. Haider (May 4, 2017),
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-and-manhattan-us-attorneyannounce-settlement-former-moneygram-executive
[https://perma.cc/X3CL-6CJC]
[hereinafter Haider FinCEN Press Release].
115. Id.
116. Levin et al., supra note 42, at 260.
117. Id.
118. See Suzanne Barlyn, Brown Brothers to pay $8 million fine for money laundering
violations, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finrabrownbrothers/brown-brothers-to-pay-8-million-fine-for-money-laundering-violationsidUSBREA1415S20140205.
119. Levin et al., supra note 42, at 260; see also See Suzanne Barlyn, FINRA fines
Raymond James $17 million for violating anti-money laundering rules, REUTERS (May
18,
2014),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-raymond-james-fi-finraidUSKCN0Y91ZW.
120. Levin et al., supra note 42, at 260
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protocol was seen as particularly concerning because Raymond James
had been fined for similar violations in 2012. As a result, she was
sanctioned for her failure to act despite notice of the specific failures of
the compliance protocols at her firm.121
On January 19, 2017, Western Union was assessed a civil monetary
penalty of $586 million in connection to a DPA with the DOJ.122 The fine
was levied as a result of Western Union’s alleged failure to maintain a
compliance program in accordance with the requirements of the BSA.123
Western Union was aware that some of its “agents,” which are essentially
franchises, were actively facilitating gambling and scam activity.124 In
connection with this case, twenty-six of those agents were prosecuted and
convicted for fraud-related charges and in some of the cases, for
violations of the BSA.125 No executives were held accountable despite
indications in the DPA that Western Union had “long been aware of the
problem.”126 However, compliance personnel recommended the
suspension or termination of problematic agents at various points, and in
some instances, such actions were carried out.127
2. Individual Accountability Under the Trump Administration
In September 2017, former U.S. Deputy Attorney General Rod
Rosenstein indicated that the Yates Memo was “under review.”128
However, Rosenstein also noted that any changes to the Yates memo
would reflect a continued resolve to hold individuals accountable for
121.
122.

Id.
Press Release, Dept. of Just., Western Union Admits Anti-Money Laundering
and Consumer Fraud Violations, Forfeits $586 Million in Settlement with Justice
Department and Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/western-union-admits-anti-money-laundering-and-consumer-fraud-violationsforfeits-586-million [https://perma.cc/R55A-BT4J] [hereinafter Western Union DOJ
Press Release].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement Attachment A at 7, 13, United States v.
The W. Union Co., 1:17-cv-00110-CCC (M.D.P.A. Jan. 19, 2018).
128. Cogan Schneier, DAG Rosenstein: Changes Coming “in the Near Future” to
Yates Memo, LAW.COM (Sept. 14, 2017, 6:09 PM), https://www.law.com/sites/
almstaff/2017/09/14/dag-rosenstein-changes-coming-in-the-near-future-to-yates-memo/
[https://perma.cc/JLK3-PKQX].
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corporate crime and clarify the policy.129 As proof of the DOJ’s ongoing
commitment, Rosenstein noted of the 132 organizations convicted of
federal offenses in 2016, more than half involved the conviction of at least
one related individual and 40 percent of those convicted individuals were
board members or owners of businesses.130 That statistic does not include
DPAs or civil penalties.131 AML-BSA enforcement actions under the
Trump administration are detailed below.
In 2017, the SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Wells
Fargo Advisors that was the result of senior compliance officers allegedly
directing SARs to be filed in a manner at odds with guidance from
regulators.132 For example, compliance officers required SARs to be filed
only when there was “proof” of criminal activity.133 This is at odds with
regulations, which only require “a reason to suspect” that transactions
might involve criminal activity.134 In this case, no individuals were held
accountable.135
In November 2017, Mehmet H. Atilla, a Turkish banker, was
convicted of charges that included conspiracy to commit money
laundering in connection with a scheme designed to evade U.S. sanctions
against Iran.136 Atilla was caught on wiretaps explaining to other traders
how to counterfeit documents to make transactions appear legitimate to

129. Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, NYU
Program on Corporate Compliance & Enforcement Keynote Address (Oct. 6, 2017)
(https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/10/06/nyu-program-on-corporatecompliance-enforcement-keynote-address-october-6-2017/
[https://perma.cc/BJE7XAGS].
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Robert M. Axelrod, COMMENTARY: Recent AML U.S. enforcements
complicate personal liability calculus for compliance staff, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2017,
11:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-aml-personal-liability/
commentary-recent-aml-u-s-enforcements-complicate-personal-liability-calculus-forcompliance-staff-idUSKBN1HO28Z [https://perma.cc/3L9Q-AV56].
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Christian Berthelsen, U.S. Seeks at Least 15 Years for Banker in Sanctions Case,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201804-04/u-s-seeks-more-than-15-year-sentence-for-turkish-banker-atilla
[https://perma.cc/BN6T-Y7ZA].
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regulators.137 It remains to be seen whether Atilla’s employer, Halkbank,
will be fined as a result of his actions.138
U.S. Bank entered a DPA with the DOJ in February 2018 in which
it admitted that the bank’s CCO rejected requests for disclosure of certain
transactions to regulators and misinformed others that the disclosures had
been made.139 The DPA noted that the CCO was an inexperienced hire.140
Again, no one at the bank was held individually accountable.141
In February 2018, Rabobank plead guilty to a criminal information
which specifically named several executives as wrongdoers.142 George
Martin, a compliance manager, was held individually accountable for
overseeing a deficient compliance operation in connection with a
Rabobank branch in Mexico.143 Martin was criminally charged with
aiding and abetting violations of the BSA, and plead guilty in a DPA with
federal prosecutors.144 The DPA states that Martin “acted voluntarily and
with the knowledge and intention of helping” other’s “willful” violations
of 31 U.S.C. § 5322.145 Specifically, Martin was informed of criminal
activity, failed to submit SARs,146 and actively suppressed investigations
into suspicious activity.147 As part of the DPA, Martin agreed to cooperate
137.
138.

Id.
See, e.g., Turkey Expects No Fine for Halkbank: Finance Minister, REUTERS
(Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-currency-albayrak-usa/turkey
-expects-no-fine-for-halkbank-finance-minister-idUSKCN1LJ0L6
[https://perma.cc/UY2E-ESL8].
139. See Axelrod, supra note 132; see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, Re:
U.S. Bancorp – Deferred Prosecution Agreement (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 12, 2018) (US Bancorp
stipulated that the facts set forth in the DPA were true).
140. See Axelrod, supra note 132, at 6.
141. Id.
142. Tom Schoenberg & Jesse Hamilton, Ex-CEO Whose Bank Hid Mexican Drug
Cash Avoids U.S. Charges, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-10-30/ex-ceo-whose-bank-hid-mexican-drug-cash-is-said-to-avoidcharges [https://perma.cc/JA4Z-9FDM].
143. Id.
144. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, U.S. v. George Martin, No. 17cr4232JM (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 14, 2017) (the DPA indicates that Martin could face up to 5 years in
prison in connection with his guilty plea for aiding and abetting willful violations of 31
U.S. Code § 5318 and 5322 and sections of the code of federal regulations which set forth
the compliance and reporting requirements under the BSA, such as Title 31 C.F.R. §
1020.210, 1020.320(a)(2)(ii), and 1020.320(a)(2)(iii)) [hereinafter George Martin DPA].
145. See id. at 9.
146. See id. at 10.
147. See id. at 7.
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against the bank’s executives.148 Martin admitted to aiding “a scheme by
his superiors to mask possible money laundering.”149 The DOJ later
declined to bring charges against those individuals.150 Rabobank agreed
to pay $368 million in conjunction with its guilty plea.151
More recently, the DOJ charged Tim Leissner, a Goldman Sachs
executive, with felony violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956.152 Leissner plead
guilty to conspiring to launder money and violate the FCPA in November
of 2018.153 These charges were in connection with the “1MDB” scandal
in which billions of dollars were embezzled from a publicly-funded entity
that was intended to fuel development in Malaysia.154 Leissner bribed
government officials and assisted in laundering hundreds of millions
through a network of shell companies.155 It has been reported that federal
authorities are considering fines against Goldman Sachs in connection
with Leissner’s conduct.156
3. Criticism of Rising Individual Accountability
The rise of AML-BSA enforcement actions against compliance
officers and bankers has been controversial in some circles. One common
criticism is that rising individual accountability has been enforced in a
148.
149.
150.
151.

See Schoenberg & Hamilton, supra note 142.
Id.
Id.
See Karen Freifeld, Rabobank Agrees to Pay $368 Million Over Processing
Illicit Funds, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rabobankfraud-usa/rabobank-agrees-to-pay-368-million-over-processing-illicit-fundsidUSKBN1FR2U4 [https://perma.cc/937Z-GZP8].
152. See Leissner Information, supra note 41, at 21.
153. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former Banker Tim Leissner Pleaded Guilty
to Conspiring to Launder Money and to Violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Related to 1MDB (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/malaysian-financierlow-taek-jho-also-known-jho-low-and-former-banker-ng-chong-hwa-also-known
[https://perma.cc/FQ65-SUVY].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Peter Eavis, How Much Could the 1MDB Scandal Cost Goldman Sachs?, N.Y.
TIMES: DEAL BOOK (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/09/business/
dealbook/goldman-1mdb-penalties.html?login=email&auth=login-email
[https://perma.cc/ZP8N-2DWE]; see also id. (a spokesman for Goldman Sachs said, “We
are in the process of assessing the details of allegations and fully expect to contest the
claim vigorously,” in connection with another lawsuit which has stemmed from this
matter).
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manner which, if continued, will cause compliance personnel to flee the
industry for fear of being unfairly “targeted.”157 Another related concern
is that CCOs could be punished for the wrongdoing of subordinates of
which they were wholly unaware.158 There is anecdotal evidence that this
sentiment is shared by many who work in the compliance industry.159 A
recent survey of compliance personnel found that “81 percent of
respondents were at least somewhat concerned about their personal
liability, with nearly a third describing personal liability as extremely
concerning.”160
It has also been argued that even civil punishment of compliance
officers is “grossly out of proportion to the individuals’ supposed
wrongdoing” and leads to “‘never-ending punishment’ through
stigmatization and banishment from the compliance industry as well as
the permanent label of an untrustworthy criminal.”161
As discussed below, these criticisms are overstated when considered
in light of the cases that have actually been pursued in this area.
III. THE FOCUS ON INTENTIONAL CONDUCT ENSURES THAT THE
EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE OF MONEY LAUNDERING DOES NOT
COME AT THE EXPENSE OF NON-CULPABLE INDIVIDUALS
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the policy directives set
forth in the Yates Memo have led to an increased emphasis on individual
accountability in AML-BSA enforcement actions of financial institutions,
particularly when compared to the 2001-2014 period in which no
individuals were held accountable in conjunction with these AML-BSA
investigations.162 However, it is clear from cases like Wells Fargo, U.S.
Bank, and Western Union that individual accountability is not pursued in
157. Court E. Golumbic, “The Big Chill”: Personal Liability and the Targeting of
Financial Sector Compliance Officers, 69 HASTINGS L. J. 45, 81–82, 85 (2017).
158. India McGee, Where Do We Go from Here? Prosecutorial Concerns of Chief
Compliance Officers, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 277, 298 (2017).
159. Golumbic, supra note 157, at 81.
160. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
161. See, e.g., Boles, supra note 4, at 421–22 (discussing the potential for civil
sanctions against compliance personnel to unfairly stigmatize them). It is important to
note that this article was written before the Yates Memorandum was issued and the
concerns were expressed in a forward-looking manner; in fact, the article discussed
relying on direct liability theories as a means to avoid the potential for inequitable results.
Id. at 429.
162. Garrett, supra note 3, at 1816.
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all cases.163 Further analysis is required to understand why, in some cases,
individuals are still not held accountable in all AML-BSA enforcement
actions.
Part A demonstrates that following the Yates Memo, the imposition
of criminal or civil liability on compliance personnel or bank officers for
AML-BSA violations is largely conditioned on the presence of
demonstrable intentional or reckless conduct. Part B explains how the
focus on intentional or reckless conduct mitigates concerns that have been
raised over the increase of individual accountability in AML-BSA
enforcement actions. Lastly, Part C suggests that the focus on intentional
or reckless conduct has the potential to enhance deterrence objectives and
to restore the public’s faith in the justice system.
A. PROSECUTIONS FOLLOWING THE YATES MEMO DEMONSTRATE THAT
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR INDIVIDUALS DEPENDS ON THE
GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY TO PROVE THE REQUISITE INTENT
The Yates Memo’s call to hold individuals accountable only applies
where there is a law under which individuals can be found liable.164
Generally speaking, under the BSA, individuals can be held criminally
liable for intentional conduct and civilly liable for reckless conduct.165
Further, civil liability can attach where compliance officers engage in
“willful blindness.”166 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, individuals must
demonstrate intent to engage in money laundering.167 Therefore, the
policies set forth in the Yates Memo are only at issue in the AML-BSA
context where there is some form of reckless or intentional conduct. The
constellation of cases discussed above demonstrates that the government
is largely committed to pursuing the policies set forth in the Yates Memo
where there is a viable path to hold individuals accountable under existing
law.

163.
164.

See infra Part III.A.3.
Cf. Yates, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that “[o]ur nation’s economy depends on
effective enforcement of the civil and criminal laws that protect our financial system and,
by extension, all our citizens.”).
165. See United States v. Caro, 454 F. App’x 817, 839 n.24 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1262 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Robins, 673 F. App’x 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2016); Levin et al., supra note 42, at 256.
166. Levin et al., supra note 42, at 256.
167. See Justice Manual, supra note 39; 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (2012).
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Broadly speaking, the cases above evidence that individuals at
financial institutions who have been implicated in money laundering face
three potential outcomes: (1) criminal punishment, (2) civil sanctions, or
(3) no liability.168 This Note will discuss further how these outcomes are
determined largely by the government’s ability to prove intentional or
reckless misconduct by an individual.
1. Criminal Punishment and Intentional Conduct
The government is willing and able to criminally prosecute
compliance officers and bank officials under the BSA and 18 U.S.C. §
1956 when individuals evince an intent to engage in or directly enable
money laundering.169 In doing so, the government has adhered to the
policies set forth in the Yates Memo.
a. Criminal Liability Under the 18 U.S.C. § 1956
One of the major difficulties involved with prosecutions under 18
U.S.C. § 1956 is the government’s ability to prove intent beyond a
reasonable doubt.170 The government is essentially tasked with proving
that an individual engaged in the act of concealing the source of funds
with specific knowledge of the funds’ illegal origin.171 Leissner and
Atilla’s individual actions, in connection with other crimes, fell within 18
U.S.C. § 1956’s prohibition of concealing or disguising the nature of
proceeds of an unlawful activity172 with the requisite intent.173 In these
cases, the government was only able to show this high level of intent
because the defendants’ actions simultaneously ran afoul of economic
sanctions, the FCPA, or prohibitions against embezzlement. Therefore, it
was possible to show that they had knowledge of the nature of the
proceeds for criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. This demonstrates
that where a bank official directly engages in the act of money laundering,
168. See, e.g., George Martin DPA, supra note 144, at 6; Levin et al., supra note 42,
at 259; Western Union DOJ Press Release, supra note 122 (each respectively discussing
the cases involving Martin, Haider, and Western Union).
169. See, e.g., George Martin DPA, supra note 144, at 6; Leissner Information, supra
note 41, at 21 (each respectively discussing the cases involving Martin and Leissner).
170. Richman, supra note 16, at 269.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (2012); see also Justice Manual, supra note 39.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B).
173. Cf. Justice Manual, supra note 39.
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they are likely to face criminal charges because it is possible to prove their
knowledge and intent based on their concurrent illegal conduct. The
government’s commitment to prosecuting these individuals represents
adherence to the policies set forth in the Yates Memo.174
b. Criminal Liability Under the BSA
It is also possible for individuals at financial institutions to face
criminal punishment under the BSA.175 George Martin’s DPA stated that
he “acted voluntarily and with the knowledge and intention of helping”
others violate the BSA and thereby aided and abetted the others’
violations.176 The difference between Martin and Haider is that Haider
merely knew about criminal activity and failed to act as required under
the BSA,177 whereas Martin was aware of criminal activity and actively
suppressed investigations into it.178 This demonstrates that although
individuals can be held civilly or criminally liable for conduct described
as “willful,”179 the meaning of willful represents a higher form of intent
in the criminal context.
The Martin prosecution represents an adherence to the Yates
Memorandum. The Yates Memo requires prosecutors to focus on
individuals from the inception of the case in order to “increase the
likelihood that individuals with knowledge of corporate misconduct will
cooperate in the investigation.”180 While charges were not ultimately
brought against the senior executives at Rabobank, the government
seemed to be following this directive through its DPA with George Martin
by attempting to develop cooperating witnesses.181

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See Yates, supra note 6, at 2.
See George Martin DPA, supra note 144, at 2, 7.
See id. at 6, 9.
Levin et al., supra note 42, at 259.
See George Martin DPA, supra note 144, at 7.
See Norman v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 189, 191–92 (2018) (citing to Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am. V. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)).
180. Yates, supra note 6, at 4.
181. See Schoenberg & Hamilton, supra note 142 (stating that Martin “agreed to
cooperate in the government’s investigation of higher-level executives.”).
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2. Civil Liability and Willful Conduct
The government has shown a commitment to pursue individual
accountability, as mandated by the Yates Memo,182 through civil
sanctions where an individual “willfully” contravenes the goals of the
BSA but their actions do not rise to criminal intent to engage in money
laundering. Haider, Crawford, and Busby received civil sanctions in
connection with conduct in their capacity as compliance officers but were
not criminally prosecuted.183 This was appropriate because their conduct
amounted to total neglect of their obligations under the BSA despite
specific knowledge of shortcomings. Their conduct, therefore, amounted
to “willful blindness,” which is sufficient for civil, but not criminal,
liability under the BSA.184
It would be very difficult to criminally prosecute someone like Tim
Haider because doing so would require a showing of intent to launder
money beyond a reasonable doubt.185 Haider’s actions are distinguishable
from Leissner, Atilla, and Martin in that (1) he did not stand to personally
benefit from money laundering, (2) he did not actively seek to engage in
money laundering, (3) his actions were not in connection with another
crime such as embezzlement or bribery, and (4) he failed to act in the face
of known criminal activity but did not overtly sabotage the compliance
program.186
With respect to civil sanctions, the government’s enforcement
actions against Haider, Crawford, and Busby demonstrate that the
government may seek civil sanctions under the BSA where a compliance
officer willfully fails to maintain an adequate compliance program.187
Haider and Crawford had knowledge of ongoing criminal activity and
failed to take any meaningful corrective action to stop it.188 Busby was on

182.
183.
184.
185.

See Yates, supra note 6, at 2.
Levin et al., supra note 42, at 259–61.
Id. at 256.
Cf. Richman, supra note 16, at 269 (discussing the difficulties of proving a case
beyond a reasonable doubt).
186. See Levin et al., supra note 42, at 259–60.
187. See id. at 259.
188. Haider FinCEN Press Release, supra note 114 (stating that Haider “fail[ed] to
terminate specific MoneyGram outlets after being presented with information that
strongly indicated that the outlets were complicit in consumer fraud schemes”); see also
Levin et al., supra note 42, at 260 (stating that Crawford was aware of strong evidence
of criminal activity and failed take action to stop it; although he did eventually
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notice of the bank’s compliance failures due to a previous enforcement
action but failed to remedy the deficiencies as required under the BSA.
For example, there were no written procedures at all for AML
procedures.189
These cases present situations in which a compliance officer was
confronted with a duty to act under the BSA in response to known
criminal activity or compliance failures. Their failure to act, despite this
knowledge, constitutes “willful blindness” and is sufficient for civil
liability under the BSA.190 The government has not civilly sanctioned
compliance officers for failures where their conduct does not have an
“aggravating” factor, such as knowledge compliance failures, paired with
a failure to act as required under the BSA.191 These enforcement actions
demonstrate that the government is committed to the policies set forth
under the Yates Memo because they are pursuing individual
accountability to the extent that existing law permits.
3. No Liability When There Is a Lack of Intent
There are circumstances in which a financial institution violates the
BSA, but its employees do not intentionally seek to assist or passively
enable money laundering.192 In these cases, there is no avenue to pursue
individual accountability under the law because the BSA and 18 U.S.C. §
1956 each require some form of intentional or reckless conduct.193 The
policies of the Yates Memo, therefore, are not at issue. In the years
following the Yates Memo, under both the Obama and Trump
administrations, the government has at times declined to hold individuals
accountable when entering into DPAs with financial institutions for
violations of the BSA.194 A close look at each of these cases demonstrates
recommend that some of the activity be halted, that recommendation was never
implemented).
189. See Levin et al., supra note 42, at 260–61 (noting that despite Raymond James
& Associates, Inc. receiving an AML-related sanction in 2012, in her capacity as the main
compliance officer, Busby failed to create a single written manual describing AML
protocols and had no control or oversight over AML-related processes).
190. See id. at 256.
191. See id. at 259–61.
192. See Axelrod, supra note 132 (discussing the Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank cases).
193. See supra Part III.A.1, Part III.A.2.
194. See Western Union DOJ Press Release, supra note 122 (noting the DPA with
Western Union during the Obama administration); see also Axelrod, supra note 132
(noting the DPAs with U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo during the Trump Administration).
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that whether someone is held individually accountable largely turns on
the individual’s intent with respect to the prohibited conduct.
The DPAs for U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo indicate that though the
compliance officers may have been aware of certain failings of their
compliance programs, they did not completely disregard their
responsibilities.195 Unlike Haider, they did not fail to act despite
knowledge of specific ongoing criminal activity; nor were these
individuals made aware of these failings through previous enforcement
actions compounded with a complete lack of established AML-protocol,
as Busby was.196 Therefore, in these cases there was no avenue to pursue
individual accountability under the BSA, which requires willful conduct,
or 18 U.S.C. § 1956, which requires intent.
With respect to Western Union,197 the government’s decision to not
hold any compliance officers or bank personnel accountable may be
explained by a lack of demonstrable intentional or reckless conduct. On
its face, the Western Union case is arguably similar to that of Haider198
because the Western Union DPA states that individuals at the bank were
aware of the scam activity.199 However, the Western Union case is
distinguishable because Haider and Crawford had knowledge of illegal
activity and each took almost no action to stop it.200 In contrast, Western
Union employees were aware of the problem and took some steps to
remedy it, which were arguably insufficient.201 For example, at various
times, Western Union compliance personnel recommended terminating
agents with reports of fraud, and agents were at times suspended or
terminated, although not with great haste.202 There is no avenue to pursue
individual accountability here because Western Union employees did not
completely disregard their responsibilities and their conduct does not
represent a “willful” violation of their responsibilities under the BSA.203
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See Axelrod, supra note 132.
See Levin et al., supra note 42, at 259–61.
See Western Union DOJ Press Release, supra note 122.
See Levin et al., supra note 42, at 259–60.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
Levin et al., supra note 42, at 259–60.
See Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between The Western Union Company
and U.S. Attorney’s Office for the M.D. Pa. at 11 (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/938371 [hereinafter Western Union
DPA].
202. Id.
203. See Levin et al., supra note 42, at 256.
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There can be no doubt that in making this distinction, the bar appears to
be set fairly high with respect to conduct that is considered actionable
under the BSA—even if only for civil sanctions. However, this is largely
a function of the legislatively proscribed “willfulness” requirement in the
BSA,204 as opposed to a failure by the government to pursue individual
accountability.
Under the BSA, compliance officers are tasked with carrying out a
risk-based compliance program.205 This role will invariably bring them
into contact with criminal activity. Based on the cases available, only
when employees of financial institutions completely ignore such activity
is their conduct sufficiently intentional or reckless to create liability under
the AML-BSA statutory framework.206 The policies of the Yates Memo
cannot be implicated with respect to conduct for which there is no avenue
to pursue criminal or civil punishment under existing law.
B. THE FOCUS ON INTENT UNDERMINES THE CRITICISMS OF INDIVIDUAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
The three main criticisms with respect to individual accountability in
AML-BSA enforcement actions against compliance personnel and bank
officials are that: (1) enforcement is carried out in an unfair manner which
could punish non-culpable individuals,207 (2) compliance personnel will
flee the industry for fear of an individualized enforcement action,208 and
(3) punishments in this area have the potential to unfairly stigmatize
compliance personnel.209 In light of the cases discussed above, it is clear
that these criticisms are largely misguided.210 The main reason these
criticisms fall flat is that some form of intentional or reckless conduct is
a necessary feature of AML-BSA enforcement actions against
individuals.211

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See Levin et al., supra note 42, at 256.
Id. at 259–62 (discussing the cases involving Haider, Crawford, and Busby).
See McGee, supra note 158, at 298.
See Golumbic, supra note 157, at 81.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A (discussing how the requirement of willfulness ensures that
only culpable individuals are held individually accountable).
211. Id.
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1. The Focus on Intent Makes Individual Accountability Predictable and
Non-Arbitrary
The statutory requirement of intentional or willful conduct for
criminal and civil punishment of compliance personnel ensures a
prosecutorial focus on culpable conduct.212 Concerns that non-culpable
individuals could be punished under the BSA213 are therefore unfounded.
In each of the civil BSA cases discussed above, compliance officers were
only punished when they were on notice of existing deficiencies in their
compliance protocol and failed to act entirely.214 Western Union helpfully
demonstrates that good faith compliance with the BSA will not result in
enforcement actions, even when an employee’s conduct with respect to
suspicious transaction activity is possibly negligent.215 This is a necessary
feature of all civil sanctions under the BSA, as 31 U.S.C. § 5321 requires
a showing of “willful” conduct in the civil context.216 Further, the fact
criminal sanctions under the BSA require a greater degree of intentional
conduct—as compared to civil actions—ensures that punishment
corresponds to an individual’s intent with respect to the specific violation
at issue.217 Therefore, the criticism that punishment in this area is unfair
has no merit because it is directly correlated to the conduct at issue.

212.
213.
214.

Id.
See McGee, supra note 158, at 298.
See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text (discussing how Crawford and
Haider were both aware of compliance failures and failed to act entirely, and how Busby
was aware of compliance failures from a previous investigation and subsequently failed
to take any steps to fix the problems).
215. See supra notes 197–204 and accompanying text (discussing how the Crawford
and Haider cases were distinguishable from the Western Union case, in which no
individuals were prosecuted, because the compliance personnel at Western Union took at
least some steps to fix the compliance failures whereas Crawford and Haider did virtually
nothing).
216. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text (discussing how civil sanctions
under 31 U.S.C § 5321 require “willful” conduct and how it has been interpreted to cover
conduct which is reckless and/or willfully blind).
217. See supra notes 73, 76 and accompanying text (discussing how the criminal
punishment under 31 U.S.C § 5324 or 31 U.S.C § 5322 requires prosecutors to
demonstrate that the conduct at issue was intentional).
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2. Compliance Officers Do Not Have a Legitimate Concern if
Punishment Only Follows Intentional or Reckless Conduct
The concern amongst compliance officers that they will be unfairly
targeted—demonstrated anecdotally in surveys218—is not warranted
because liability only attaches to willful conduct.219 As discussed above,
all compliance officers who have received civil sanctions were on notice
of serious compliance deficiencies and failed to do anything to meet their
responsibilities under the BSA.220
To avoid civil or criminal sanctions, compliance officers should
refrain from (1) engaging in a wholesale disregard for their
responsibilities221 and (2) directly engaging or assisting in money
laundering themselves.222 An individual can avoid receiving a DUI or a
speeding ticket by (1) abstaining from driving under the influence and (2)
driving within the speed limit—both being behaviors which are entirely
within the individual’s own control. Similarly, compliance officers
concerned that they will be unfairly targeted need only ensure that they
are carrying out their responsibilities under the BSA in good faith. Again,
Western Union demonstrates the high bar that is set for compliance
personnel223 and shows that personal accountability does not attach to
negligent conduct under the existing statutory framework that explicitly
requires willfulness. To the extent compliance officers are concerned, that
is evidence of the deterrent effect that the Yates Memo seeks to create
through the pursuit of individual accountability in this context.224
218. See Golumbic, supra note 157, at 81 (stating that “[a] recent survey of CCOs
conducted by the law firm DLA Piper also revealed that ‘81 percent of respondents were
at least somewhat concerned’ about their personal liability, with nearly a third describing
personal liability as ‘extremely concerning.’”).
219. See Norman v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 189, 192 (2018) (citing to Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)).
220. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text (discussing how the civil
sanctions cases all involved situations in which individuals were knowledgeable of
specific compliance failures and did virtually nothing to remedy the violations).
221. See id.
222. See George Martin DPA, supra note 144, at 2 (stating “[Martin] acted voluntarily
with the knowledge and intention of helping others commit an offense against the United
States of American under Title 31, United States Code, Sections 5318 and 5322, and the
statutes and regulations issued thereunder”).
223. See, e.g., Western Union DPA, supra note 201.
224. See Yates, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that individual accountability “deters future
illegal activity; it incentivizes changes in corporate behavior; it ensures that the proper
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3. The Focus on Intent Ensures Proportional Punishment
Concerns that individual accountability is overly-harsh and has the
potential to unfairly stigmatize individuals225 are similarly unfounded.
First, the statutory requirement of willfulness has different meanings
in the civil and criminal contexts.226 The cases discussed in Part II.C
demonstrate that: (1) criminal liability follows direct intent to assist
money laundering,227 (2) civil liability follows a complete abdication of
responsibility when coupled with notice of specific compliance
failures,228 and (3) and no liability attaches where conduct does not rise
past negligence.229 Any concern that punishment is not proportional is
substantially mitigated by the fact that the severity or existence of any
punishment is directly correlated to the individual’s intent.230
Second, the stigma associated with individual accountability as a
barrier to future employment is hardly a unique feature of AML-BSA
enforcement actions.231 In the AML-BSA context, even minimal civil
sanctions such as Crawford’s $25,000 fine and one-month ban from the
industry232 could diminish the prospects of future employment. However,
it is important to note that compliance officers are charged with the
serious task of ensuring that their financial institution does not become a
money laundering vehicle for terrorism, human trafficking, narcotics
parties are held responsible for their actions; and it promotes the public’s confidence in
our justice system.”).
225. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
226. See Norman v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 189, 192 (2018); 31 U.S.C. § 5322.
227. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing how Martin and Leissner each intended to
engage in money laundering activity).
228. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing how Crawford and Haider were both aware of
compliance failures and failed to act entirely, and how Busby was aware of compliance
failures from a previous investigation and subsequently failed to take any steps to fix the
problems).
229. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing how compliance personnel at Western Union
received no civil or criminal sanctions because they took at least some steps to fix the
compliance failures).
230. See, e.g., Boles, supra note 4, at 429 (advocating for reliance on theories of direct
liability to avoid the potential for arbitrary prosecution of compliance personnel).
231. See Understanding Policies that Impact Employment Opportunities for People
Who Have Criminal Records, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, THE
NATIONAL REENTRY RESOURCE CENTER, https://csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/employmentopportunities-for-people-with-criminal-records/ [https://perma.cc/AP57-XL79] (last
visited Mar. 18, 2019).
232. See Levin et al., supra note 42, at 260.
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trafficking, or other serious crimes.233 Failing in this task enables the
proliferation of virtually all profit-oriented crimes.234 The resulting stigma
of punishment is a natural and necessary consequence of the imposition
of sanctions against individuals who acted willfully if there is to be any
deterrent effect for the individual and the market generally.
C. THE FOCUS ON INTENTIONAL CONDUCT FOLLOWING THE YATES MEMO
WILL INCREASE DETERRENCE AND RESTORE PUBLIC FAITH IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM
The DOJ’s focus on intentional and reckless conduct in AML-BSA
enforcement actions will likely further the government’s interest in
deterrence of money laundering activity and the public’s interest in
holding individuals accountable for wrongdoing.
1. Individual Accountability and Deterrence
The government’s interest in deterrence of money laundering is
furthered by increased individual accountability in AML-BSA
enforcement actions in two ways: it sends a message (1) to the individuals
and financial institutions not to engage in such conduct, and (2) to the
market that such conduct is strictly prohibited.235 By pursuing criminal or
civil liability against individuals for willful violations of the BSA, the
government has made AML-BSA enforcement actions consistent with
other areas of the law in which punishment is proportional to an
individual’s culpability.236 This proportionality is essential to effective
deterrence because market participants will understand that if they are
aware of specific failures of their compliance programs and fail to act,
they could be held personally accountable, as opposed to only their
employer having liability.237
It is important to note that civil liability can effectively serve
deterrence interests.238 As the former Chair of the SEC, Mary Jo White,
said, “When people fear for their own reputations, careers, or

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See Boles, supra note 4, at 374–75.
Id.
See Richman, supra note 16, at 276
See generally DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 119.
See Levin et al., supra note 42, at 256.
See Boles, supra note 4, at 424.
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pocketbooks, they tend to stay in line.”239 Surveys showing concern over
individual liability amongst compliance personnel240 are anecdotal
evidence that the AML-BSA enforcement actions following the Yates
Memo are having the desired deterrent effect on the market. This is in
stark contrast to the government’s approach in 2001–2014, in which it
would enter into a DPA to resolve an AML-BSA enforcement-action with
a financial institution and hold no individuals accountable,241 a practice
which has been criticized for its failure to deter individuals from engaging
in the activity.242
The requirement of intentional or reckless conduct also imposes an
important restraint on AML-BSA enforcement actions aimed at furthering
the government’s interest in the deterrence of money laundering.243 As
discussed in Part III.A.3, negligent conduct is not within the scope of the
AML-BSA statutory framework by which individuals can be held
individually accountable for compliance failures.244 The intent
requirements create obstacles to furthering the interests of deterrence in
individual cases, but in the long term, serve to ensure that the
government’s interest in deterrence does not unfairly punish non-culpable
individuals. Ultimately, the key to effective deterrence lies in the
commitment of sustained prosecutorial resources to hold individuals
accountable on a consistent basis.245 The government seems poised to
continue pursuing individual accountability in AML-BSA enforcement
actions against financial institutions in the future.246
Successful deterrence of corporate misconduct requires a recognition
that corporations are comprised of individuals must be deterred on an
individual level.247 The Yates Memo and the cases that followed it
demonstrate that the government has made that recognition. To the extent
that individual accountability can deter this conduct in the future, that is
239. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Address at the Council of Institutional Investors Fall
Conference (Sept. 26, 2013).
240. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
241. Garrett, supra note 3, at 1816.
242. See Henry, supra note 55, at 155–56.
243. Cf. Richman, supra note 16, at 269 (discussing the practical difficulties of
bringing cases against individuals in corporations).
244. See supra Part.III.A.3.
245. Richman, supra note 16, at 276.
246. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text; see also Rosenstein, supra note
128.
247. See White, supra note 5.
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a positive development in light of the devastating social and economic
harms of money laundering.248
2. Individual Accountability and Faith in the Justice System
One of the stated objectives of the Yates Memo was to increase the
public’s confidence in the justice system.249 Increased individual
accountability—both in AML-BSA enforcement actions and generally—
has the potential to increase the public’s faith in the justice system.250
There is a deep-rooted expectation in society that individuals who engage
in intentional misconduct will be punished.251
Following the economic crisis in 2008, the perceived failure of the
government to prosecute individuals in connection with the underlying
causes of the market crash fostered a sentiment amongst some members
of the public that individuals at financial institutions were above the
law.252 A similar sentiment was expressed by Senators Elizabeth Warren
and Charles Grassley following the HSBC DPA for BSA violations in
2014.253 These concerns have weight in the BSA context. In light of these
concerns, the trend towards holding individuals accountable for AMLBSA violations in recent years is a positive development. Over time,
consistent adherence to the policies set forth in the Yates Memo could
serve restore the public’s faith that all people—regardless of wealth and
power—are equal before the law.
CONCLUSION
The role of intent in criminal law cannot be understated. While intent
has historically played a foundational role in criminal law generally, the
role of intent in the AML-BSA context is only just being realized in light
of the recent increase of enforcement actions against individuals. The
mens rea requirements within the AML-BSA statutory framework are not
248.
249.
250.

See Boles, supra note 4, at 374–75 (discussing the harms of money laundering).
Id.
Cf. see Yates, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that individual accountability “deters
future illegal activity; it incentivizes changes in corporate behavior; it ensures that the
proper parties are held responsible for their actions; and it promotes the public’s
confidence in our justice system.”).
251. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 121.
252. See Henry, supra note 55, at 155–56; see also Richman, supra note 16, at 266.
253. Garrett, supra note 3, at 1818.
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necessarily intuitive. However, a focus on the role of mens rea in recent
cases has demonstrated an unfolding a degree of clarity regarding the
scope of individual accountability in AML-BSA enforcement actions.
These cases demonstrate how the statutory and prosecutorial focus
on intentional or reckless—as opposed to negligent—conduct ensures that
any sanction, criminal or civil, is: (1) proportional to an individual’s
conduct, and (2) aimed directly at the individuals culpable of misconduct
proscribed within the AML-BSA statutory framework. In this way, the
recent prosecutions of individuals at financial institutions have comported
with societal expectations that intentional misconduct is a necessary
feature of legitimate criminal punishment by the government. Further, by
focusing on intentional or reckless conduct in AML-BSA enforcement
actions, the government stands to deter money laundering conduct in the
future. By holding individuals at financial institutions accountable, the
government’s actions in this area are a step in the right direction—that is,
towards the restoration of the public’s faith in the ability of the justice
system to reach all forms of culpable conduct.

